Includes bibliographical references and index.

I: Elements of a theory of strategy. The retarded science of international strategy -- An essay on bargaining -- Bargaining, communication, and limited war -- II: A reorientation of game theory. Toward a theory of interdependent decision -- Enforcement, communication, and strategic moves -- Game theory and experimental research -- III: Strategy with a random ingredient. Randomization of promises and threats -- The threat that leaves something to chance -- IV: Surprise attack : a study in mutual distrust. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack -- Surprise attack and disarmament -- Appendices: Nuclear weapons and limited war ; For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory ; Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "noncooperative" games.

'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.'