Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
Weber, Steve.
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control - Princeton University Press. - 1 online resource
List of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index.
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the.
9781400862436 1400862434 9780691027661 0691027668
Nuclear arms control--United States.
Game Theory
POLITICAL SCIENCE--International Relations--General.
JX1974.7 / W38
Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control - Princeton University Press. - 1 online resource
List of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index.
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the.
9781400862436 1400862434 9780691027661 0691027668
Nuclear arms control--United States.
Game Theory
POLITICAL SCIENCE--International Relations--General.
JX1974.7 / W38