000			02014cam a2200349M 4500
001			on1091523915
003			OCoLC
005			20241104140703.0
006			m o d
007			cr unu||||||||
008			190108nuuuuuuuuxx o 000 0 eng d
020			_a9781400862436 _q(online)
020			_a1400862434
020			_a9780691027661
020			_a0691027668
035			_a(OCoLC)1091523915
040			_beng _cGAFCSC LIBRARY
050		4	_aJX1974.7 _bW38
100	1		_aWeber, Steve.
245	1	0	_aCooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
260			_bPrinceton University Press.
300			_a1 online resource
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
505	0		_aList of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index.
520			_aIf international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the.
650		0	_aNuclear arms control _zUnited States.
650		2	_aGame Theory
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE _xInternational Relations _xGeneral. _2bisacsh
758			_ihas work: _aCooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Text) _1https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGrvK3DQwQRMryxVF9w3Hy _4https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
942			_2lcc _cBK _kJX1974.7 _mW38 _n0
948			_hNO HOLDINGS IN GHUCC - 9 OTHER HOLDINGS
999			_c1815 _d1815