air power and coercion in war Pape, Robert Anthony 1960- creator text bibliography Case studies nyu Ithaca, N.Y Cornell University Press 1996 monographic eng

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vii, 366 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm Can air bombardment break the morale of an enemy and force it to capitulate or does it strengthen the enemy's determination to resist? In the first major book since the Vietnam War on the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates. Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing operations and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. Pape argues convincingly that airpower is no "magic bullet" nor a way to win inexpensively. His conclusions will provoke debate from the highest military circles to the armchair generals in academia and Congress and have ramifications for questions from defense budget cuts to international policy in Bosnia. The wealth of systematically collected evidence should be a source of scholarly debates for years to come. 1. Why Study Military Coercion? -- 2. Explaining Military Coercion -- 3. Coercive Air Power -- 4. Japan, 1944-1945 -- 5. Korea, 1950-1953 -- 6. Vietnam, 1965-1972 -- 7. Iraq, 1991 -- 8. Germany, 1942-1945 -- 9. Beyond Strategic Bombing -- Appendix: Coding Cases of Coercive Air Power. Robert A. Pape. Includes bibliographical references and index. Bombing, Aerial Case studies Air power Case studies Air power Strategie UG700 .P11 Pape, Robert Anthony, 1960- Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, �1996 (OCoLC)605352544 0801431344 9780801431340 0801483115 9780801483110 95045071 951011 20241209120422.0 ocm33334826 eng