TY  - BOOK
AU  - Woodworth,Steven E.
TI  - Davis and Lee at war
T2  - Modern war studies
SN  - 0700607188
AV  - E467.1.D26 W86
PY  - 1995///
CY  - Lawrence, Kan.
PB  - University Press of Kansas
KW  - Davis, Jefferson,
KW  - Lee, Robert E.
KW  - Davis, Jefferson.
KW  - Confederate States of America
KW  - Army
KW  - History
KW  - Military campaigns
KW  - fast
KW  - Command of troops
KW  - Strategie
KW  - gnd
N1  - Includes bibliographical references (pages 387-396) and index; The mantle of Washington -- Our army does not advance -- A mutinous and disorganizing spirit -- So many failures -- The stake is too high -- Between the defeat of an army and its ruin -- Victory or subjugation -- A question of time
N2  - In the critically acclaimed Jefferson Davis and His Generals Steven Woodworth showed how the failures of Davis and his military leaders in the West paved the way for Confederate defeat. In Davis and Lee at War he concludes his study of Davis as rebel commander-in-chief and shows how the lack of a unified purpose and strategy in the East sealed the Confederacy's fate. Woodworth argues that Davis and Robert E. Lee, the South's greatest military leader, had sharply conflicting views over the proper conduct of the war. Davis was convinced that the South should fight a defensive war, to simply outlast the North's political and popular support for the war. By contrast, Lee and the other eastern generals - notably P.G.T. Beauregard, Gustavus Smith, and Stonewall Jackson - were eager for the offensive. They were convinced that only quick and decisive battlefield victories would prevent the North from eventually defeating them with its overwhelming advantage in men and materials. The result of this tense tug-of-war was Davis's misguided pursuit of a middle ground that gave neither strategy its best chance for success
ER  -