03860cam a2200445 a 4500001001300000003000600013005001700019008004100036010001700077015001900094020001500113020001800128035005600146040002400202041001300226043003000239050001600269100003400285240003000319245007100349260004500420300002300465336002600488504004100514505027700555520182100832520027902653546004002932600003302972648001503005650002803020650001303048650003403061651005003095653001303145653001603158655001803174776014803192856007403340ocm26722270 OCoLC20241120121811.0920707s1993 enk b 000 0 eng  a 92026232  aGB93070072bnb a0710304595 a9780710304599 a(OCoLC)26722270z(OCoLC)28465638z(OCoLC)1176359539 bengcGAFCSC LIBRARY1 aenghara aap-----aa-iq---aa-ku---00aDS79.72bQ21 aQusaybi, Ghazi Abd al-Rahman.10aAzmat al-Khalij.lEnglish14aThe Gulf Crisis :ban attempt to understand /cGhazi A. Algosaibi. aLondon ;aNew York :bKegan Paul,c1993. a156 pages ;c23 cm atextbtxt2rdacontent aIncludes bibliographical references.0 a1. The Decision -- 2. The Storm -- 3. Coalition and Counter-Coalition -- 4. The Propaganda Battle -- 5. The Heirs' Expectations -- 6. The Unattractive 'Bedouin' and the Ugly 'Arab' -- 7. An American Conspiracy or a New World Order? -- 8. The Future: Dialogue or Explosion.1 a"Of all the books published on the Gulf Crisis, this is the first to have been written by a major figure intimately linked to many of the main players in the drama. From his vantage point as a Cabinet Minister in Saudi Arabia, Ghazi Algosaibi developed close relations with King Fahd as well as with other Gulf Cooperation Council leaders. Then, as Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to Bahrain, he watched at very close quarters as events in the Gulf unfolded, culminating in the storm that swept over the Arab world in the summer of 1990." "His account of these events is told from the inside-where no reporters were allowed - and many facts are revealed here for the first time. Considering the decision that led Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait, Ghazi Algosaibi examines Saddam's psychological make-up, his adventurism and his involvement in the Iraqi-Iranian war, which preceded the invasion. Detailed attention is given to the reaction of Gulf and other Arab leaders to the internal debates and negotiations that led up to the commencement of hostilities, little of which was known of in the outside world at the time. Once the invasion was mounted, Arab diplomacy became active at the highest levels, searching for an Arab solution that would get the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. The diplomatic manoeuvres are set out comprehensively, and the question of what motivated a number of Arab leaders to support the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is addressed. The author outlines the reaction of the Gulf media to the invasion, and the ensuing media 'mother of battles' between media representing opposing sides of the conflict. The work also considers the 'fundamentalist' position on the invasion of Kuwait, and deals with the continuing internal conflicts between two groups - settled Arabs and the traditionally nomadic Bedouin."8 a"In conclusion, Ghazi Algosaibi calls for a continuing Arab-Arab dialogue as the only alternative to an internal explosion like that of the Gulf Crisis. This important work gives a unique 'Gulf' perspective on the Crisis, and on evolving events in the Middle East."--Jacket. aTranslation of: Azmat al-Khal�ij.10aHussein, Saddam,d1937-2006. 7a19912fast 0aPersian Gulf War, 1991. 2aGulf War 7aPolitics and government2fast 0aPersian Gulf RegionxPolitics and government.0 aGulf War0 aMiddle East 7aHistory2fast08iOnline version:aQusaybi, Ghazi Abd al-Rahman.sAzmat al-Khalij. English.tGulf Crisis.dLondon ; New York : Kegan Paul, 1993w(OCoLC)609974072413Table of contentsuhttp://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780710304599.pdf