TY  - BOOK
AU  - Paul,T.V.
TI  - Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers 
T2  - Cambridge Studies in International Relations
SN  - 9780511598746
AV  - JX4511 P28
PY  - 1994///
CY  - Cambridge
PB  - Cambridge University Press
KW  - War (International law)
KW  - Great powers
KW  - States, Small
N1  - Title from publishers bibliographic system (viewed on 22 Dec 2011); Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of tables ; Preface ; PARTI THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ; 1 Introduction: war initiation in international relations theory ; Power parity and war initiation; Preponderance and war initiation; War initiation in decision level theories; War initiation in deterrence theory; War initiation in an expected utility model; Why study asymmetric wars?; 2 Explaining war initiation by weaker powers in asymmetric conflicts Introduction; Some assumptions; Defining concqjts; Why asymmetric war initiations occur; The strategic factor in asymmetric war initiation; Offensive weapons, limited capability and war initiation; Alliance support and war calculations; Domestic structure and asymmetric war initiation; Summarizing the argument; A methodological note; PART II THE CASE STUDIES; 3 The Japanese offensive against Russia, 1904 The balance of capabilities; The Russo-Japanese conflict: an imperial rivalry; Russia's diplomatic and political posture; Russia's military strategy: dominance of defense; Japan's strategic calculations; Offense dominance; Alliance configurations in 1904; Domestic changes; Explaining the Japanese decision to strike; 4 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941 ; The US strategy vis-a-vis Japan; Japan's strategic calculations; Changing capabilities; Changing alliance relationshipsDomestic changes prior to December 1941; Why no war before 1941?; Explaining the Japanese decision in 1941; 5 The Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950 ; The US strategy in Korea; China's strategic assumptions; From defense to offense; Weapons capability in Chinese calculations; Soviet support in China's calculations; Domestic compulsions and the decision to intervene; Why intervention was delayed; Explaining the Chinese intervention; 6 The Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965 India's strategy: a failure to deter?; Pakistan's strategic calculations; Changing military doctrine: dominance of offense; Offensive capability in 1965; Changing alliance configurations; Shifts in decision-making structure; Why no war in 1962?; Explaining the Pakistani decision in 1965; 7 The Egyptian offensive in the Sinai, 1973 ; The Israeli strategy in 1973; Egypt's strategic assumptions in 1973; Weapons in Egyptian war plans
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598746
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UR  - http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/standrews/cambridgebooksonlinetrial
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ER  -