War Initiation by Weaker Powers Paul, T. V. creator text enk Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1994 monographic eng 1 online resource (264 pages) Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of tables ; Preface ; PARTI THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ; 1 Introduction: war initiation in international relations theory ; Power parity and war initiation; Preponderance and war initiation; War initiation in decision level theories; War initiation in deterrence theory; War initiation in an expected utility model; Why study asymmetric wars? 2 Explaining war initiation by weaker powers in asymmetric conflicts Introduction; Some assumptions; Defining concqjts; Why asymmetric war initiations occur; The strategic factor in asymmetric war initiation; Offensive weapons, limited capability and war initiation; Alliance support and war calculations; Domestic structure and asymmetric war initiation; Summarizing the argument; A methodological note; PART II THE CASE STUDIES. 3 The Japanese offensive against Russia, 1904 The balance of capabilities; The Russo-Japanese conflict: an imperial rivalry; Russia's diplomatic and political posture; Russia's military strategy: dominance of defense; Japan's strategic calculations; Offense dominance; Alliance configurations in 1904; Domestic changes; Explaining the Japanese decision to strike; 4 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941 ; The US strategy vis-a-vis Japan; Japan's strategic calculations; Changing capabilities. Changing alliance relationshipsDomestic changes prior to December 1941; Why no war before 1941?; Explaining the Japanese decision in 1941; 5 The Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950 ; The US strategy in Korea; China's strategic assumptions; From defense to offense; Weapons capability in Chinese calculations; Soviet support in China's calculations; Domestic compulsions and the decision to intervene; Why intervention was delayed; Explaining the Chinese intervention. 6 The Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965 India's strategy: a failure to deter?; Pakistan's strategic calculations; Changing military doctrine: dominance of offense; Offensive capability in 1965; Changing alliance configurations; Shifts in decision-making structure; Why no war in 1962?; Explaining the Pakistani decision in 1965; 7 The Egyptian offensive in the Sinai, 1973 ; The Israeli strategy in 1973; Egypt's strategic assumptions in 1973; Weapons in Egyptian war plans. T.V. Paul. Title from publishers bibliographic system (viewed on 22 Dec 2011). War (International law) Great powers States, Small JX4511 P28 9780511598746 0511598742 9780521451178 0521451175 9780521466219 0521466210 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598746 https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4641382 http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/standrews/cambridgebooksonlinetrial https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9780511598746 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598746 https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4641382 http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/standrews/cambridgebooksonlinetrial https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9780511598746 090721 20241104142413.0 ocn776969524 eng