02014cam a2200349M 4500 on1091523915 OCoLC 20241104140703.0 m o d cr unu|||||||| 190108nuuuuuuuuxx o 000 0 eng d 9781400862436 (online) 1400862434 9780691027661 0691027668 (OCoLC)1091523915 eng GAFCSC LIBRARY JX1974.7 W38 Weber, Steve. Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Princeton University Press. 1 online resource text txt rdacontent List of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index. If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the. Nuclear arms control United States. Game Theory POLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations General. bisacsh has work: Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGrvK3DQwQRMryxVF9w3Hy https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork lcc BK JX1974.7 W38 0 NO HOLDINGS IN GHUCC - 9 OTHER HOLDINGS 1815 1815 0 0 lcc 0 0 REF GAFC GAFC GEN 2024-11-04 0 JX1974.7 W38 2024-2869 2024-11-04 14:07:31 C.1 (1) 2024-11-04 BK 0 0 lcc 0 0 REF GAFC GAFC GEN 2024-11-04 0 JX1974.7 W38 2024-2870 2024-11-04 14:07:31 C.1 (2) 2024-11-04 BK 0 0 lcc 0 0 REF GAFC GAFC GEN 2024-11-04 0 JX1974.7 W38 2024-2871 2024-11-04 14:07:31 C.1 (3) 2024-11-04 BK 0 0 lcc 0 0 REF GAFC GAFC GEN 2024-11-04 0 JX1974.7 W38 2024-2872 2024-11-04 14:07:31 C.1 (4) 2024-11-04 BK