01889cam a2200313M  4500001001300000003000600013005001700019006001900036007001500055008004100070020002800111020001500139020001800154020001500172035002200187040002400209050001800233100001800251245005600269260003200325300002200357336002600379505025800405520060400663650004101267650001601308650006601324758018501390on1091523915OCoLC20241104140703.0m     o  d        cr unu||||||||190108nuuuuuuuuxx      o     000 0 eng d  a9781400862436q(online)  a1400862434  a9780691027661  a0691027668  a(OCoLC)1091523915  bengcGAFCSC LIBRARY 4aJX1974.7bW381 aWeber, Steve.10aCooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control  bPrinceton University Press.  a1 online resource  atextbtxt2rdacontent0 aList of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index.  aIf international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the. 0aNuclear arms controlzUnited States. 2aGame Theory 7aPOLITICAL SCIENCExInternational RelationsxGeneral.2bisacsh  ihas work:aCooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Text)1https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGrvK3DQwQRMryxVF9w3Hy4https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork